Can the Middle Corridor Deliver?

For the past few years, the “Middle Corridor”, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has referred to a practical idea: moving freight between Western China and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus, then through Türkiye – mainly by rail, with a maritime leg in the middle. In a world plagued by constant turmoil, the route offers an opportunity to bypass Russia and somewhat reduce dependence on the Suez Canal. Since 2022, the importance of the Corridor and the international attention it has received have increased. Yet the question arises: can this route really deliver?

It can, but the formula is not that simple. The Middle Corridor’s real strategic value is to be a backup: an alternative trade route in a world where sanctions, additional costs arising from war risks, political chokepoints, and maritime disruptions can interfere with global supply chains and even rewrite logistics overnight. That was the main motive for countries to increase their interest and involvement after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, and therefore the geopolitical value of the Corridor has increased and become one of the main tools of Eurasian connectivity.

Despite all this, the ideas still exceed the Corridor’s current performance and capabilities. The main reason for this is that the Corridor, or by another name, the TITR is not a single line drawn on a map, it is a chain of national systems interlocked together, with different rail operators, border regimes, tariff schedules, port capacities and of course ship availability across the Caspian, and repeated delays at transfer hubs. That kind of complexity is precisely what makes it geopolitically attractive and operationally difficult.

Why it matters now

Every country covers a different case. For Central Asian countries the importance of the Middle Corridor is obvious: the landlocked economies need more than one viable route to market, and the corridor can push cooperation because bottlenecks are – usually – shared. For the EU, the corridor is increasingly part of a broader agenda that combines supply-chain resilience, connectivity, and risk reduction – especially for critical raw materials and time-sensitive trade. Türkiye, for its part, is not just a transit country at the western end, but a logistical hub between the Caucasus and European networks, as well as a political stakeholder with incentives to deepen East–West transport links that do not depend on Russia.

In recent years, multimodality has become one of the most important buzzwords in international trade. This is also the Middle Corridor’s defining feature – railways on both sides with a maritime section in the middle – but this is also its main vulnerability. There are a few obstacles that must be considered. To mention a few: marine capacity issues at the Caspian, overcrowding of ports, weather disruptions, and vessel shortages – these all can cause unpredictability, loss of trust, however in theory, this route is an effective tool of competitiveness. Recent studies, for instance from the  OECD and the World Bank, emphasize that functional performance depends on identifying and dealing with the bottlenecks along the route, rather than issuing impressive statements. These bottlenecks are very practical ones, including the ports, scheduling, border control agencies, and the reliability of transshipment operations.

These are the reasons why the corridor cannot replace existing routes for now, as it is suitable only for diversification and and specific freight markets. Even optimistic evaluations say the benefits of the route are conditional, which require sustained coordination, investment and reform across multiple jurisdictions, along with the improvement of international cooperation that can enhance these.

The Corridor should pass at least three tests

1)    Reliability over symbolism. The Corridor and the traders who use the route need predictable transit times, because while it sounds good on paper, how many days can the journey of a product arriving from China be shortened, if this is not the case. No more banner headlines or constant parade of investors at ever-growing summits are needed. Most of the investors who are needed for the development of the Corridor have already lined up, but the soft infrastructure must be advanced. That means aligning procedures, reducing stop-and-go delays at borders, and making schedules dependable enough for freight forwarders to increase proper plannability and predictability. These can enhance the effectiveness rather than financing megaprojects alone.

2)    Capacity where the route is the most vulnerable. In the past period, investments focused on showcase, big priority projects, rather than developing the route’s weak points. Ports and terminals around the Caspian Sea, vehicle fleet availability, adequate rail network connection, and transshipment infrastructure can be bottlenecks along the entire route. A recently published World Bank analysis also highlights that targeted improvements in these weak points, coupled with better corridor management, can improve both speed and cost competitiveness.

3)    Management that fits the geography of the corridor. A multi-country route needs a multi-country operating logic with shared KPIs, transparent tariffs, and most importantly predictable access rules alongside dispute-resolution practices that reduce commercial risk. The growth of the corridor depends as much on institutional coordination as on infrastructure.

The Middle Corridor gained significance because the geopolitical environment shifted, but the same dynamics will also shape its limits. Russia remains an important player in Eurasian connectivity, however the Corridor’s main potential lies in the fact that states are trying to reduce their exposure, increase their own space and power, without it posing a destabilizing force in the region. Meanwhile, the South Caucasus region also remains sensitive with political risks, periodically disputed borders, and security uncertainties which can lead to drastically increasinginsurance costs and investor caution – regardless of how compelling the map looks.

The question remains: deliver what, exactly?

If “deliver” means replacing the Northern Corridor or becoming a China–Europe superhighway in the near term, the answer is no. The route along the old Silk Road has great prospective, but it is still a patchwork system with bottlenecks – especially at the Caspian– and its competitiveness fluctuates with disruptions elsewhere.

But if by “deliver” we mean something more realistic – a scaled, credible alternative that grows volumes, strengthens Central Asian cooperation, gives Türkiye and the Caucasus more intense logistics relevance, and offers Europe and China a safeguard against single-route dependence and resilience to geopolitical problems – then yes. Many recent policy and analyst assessments reach the same point: the corridor’s real value is strategic optionality, an additional channel that reduces overreliance on any single route. In that sense, the Middle Corridor will “deliver” if it is treated less as a headline project and more as a challenge to be solved; a reliably managed system with coordinated operations, transparent rules, and built-in resilience to disruption. This is what separates a route that looks strategic on a map from one that traders can plan around and ultimately trust.

References:

(1)  Geopolitical Monitor – “The Middle Corridor: A Route Born of the New Eurasian Geopolitics” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-middle-corridor-a-route-born-of-the-new-eurasian-geopolitics/

(2)  Atlantic Council – “Why the Middle Corridor matters amid a geopolitical resorting” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/ac-turkey-defense-journal/why-the-middle-corridor-matters-amid-a-geopolitical-resorting/

(3)  Asia House (2025. július 20.) – “The Middle Corridor: the future of Central Asian growth and cooperation” https://www.asiahouse.org/2025/07/20/the-middle-corridor-the-future-of-central-asian-growth-and-cooperation/

(4)  European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) – “The Middle Corridor Initiative: Where Europe and Asia meet” https://eias.org/publications/briefing-paper/the-middle-corridor-initiative-where-europe-and-asia-meet/

(5)  ADBI / Asian Development Bank Institute – Middle Corridor policy development & trade potential (PDF) https://www.adb.org/publications/middle-corridor-policy-development-trade-potential

(6)  OECD (2023) – Realising the Potential of the Middle Corridor (PDF) https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/publication/middle-trade-and-transport-corridor

(7)  World Bank – Middle Trade and Transport Corridor (PDF) https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2023/12/16/realizing-the-full-potential-of-the-middle-corridor

(8)  RAND (2024) – “The Middle Corridor: A renaissance in global commerce?” thttps://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/03/the-middle-corridor-a-renaissance-in-global-commerce.html

(9)  SWP Berlin (2022) – Middle Corridor / connectivity & geopolitics (paper) thttps://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C64/

ODI – “The Middle Corridor: trends and opportunities” https://odi.org/en/insights/the-middle-corridor-trends-and-opportunities/

Author: Blanka Benkő-Kovács, advisor - LCTS, LUPS