Kazakhstan’s ‘Historic’ Kurultai Election
Kazakhstan’s ‘Historic’ Kurultai Election
On 23 August 2026, all 145 members of Kazakhstan’s new unicameral legislature, the Kurultai, were elected under the country’s freshly adopted constitution. Marketed to citizens as a “historic” vote that would empower parliament, the election in practice consolidated President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev’s control over the political arena and carefully orchestrated a form of managed pluralism.
The new architecture of the Kurultai
The vote constituted the first real test of the new 2026 Constitution, which was ratified in a referendum in March and became effective on 1 July, and eliminated the previous bicameral system of the Mazhilis and Senate in favour of a single institution called the Kurultai, as the most significant representation body. The new rules will see deputies elected in a single nationwide constituency with a five percent threshold, and independent candidatures, which were previously a low volume means of political participation, have been eliminated from the law altogether, a change which OSCE/ODIHR explicitly noted as a violation of international standards. This streamlining, in the name of strengthening the weight of parliament in decision-making, is also a way of centralizing the control of candidates and party access to parliament by the elites. [1]
Results behind the rhetoric of reform
The unofficial statistics and the exit polls are an old story for the post‑Soviet “reformist” governments. The new Adilet party (essentially the inheritors of the long dominant Amanat) got about 71 percent of the votes cast and turnout was near three-quarters of registered voters - a remarkably high rate in a party system where there is little real competition. Although smaller groups like Auyl, Respublica, Aq Jol and the “Nationwide Social Democratic Party” were close to making the cut to parliament, the People's Party of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Baytaq Greens did not cross the threshold, and the Kurultai was made up almost entirely of parties that openly backed Tokayev that are believed to strongly support the presidential administration. [2]
Under Tokayev, the policy of managed pluralism was adopted
The authorities have wanted these elections and the new constitution to be a departure from the Nazarbayev era's super‑presidential system, stressing formal powers that they claim are being transferred to parliament. But as international observers point out, the political reality of the elections is far darker: OSCE/ODIHR's preliminary findings highlight the fact that the elections were technically well prepared but were conducted in an environment that did not offer genuine political pluralism, with no distinction between party platforms, and the exclusion of the right to stand as an independent candidate “reducing political choice.” [3]
Domestic governance calculations
The Kurultai and the August vote were not only part of a strategy of re‑legitimisation after a time of social turmoil and elite re-negotiation but also reflected a deliberate avoidance of the risks associated with genuine opposition politics. Tokayev’s strategy involves folding Amanat’s legacy into Adilet and surrounding it with a tight circle of junior partners, ensuring that no single actor within the ruling camp acquires disruptive leverage. Meanwhile, the general turnout and the excellent organization (observed throughout the day by the Central Election Commission) is meant to send a message of stability and efficiency in administration to both the home and foreign electorates. [4]
The international observation and external signalling
Kazakhstan was subject of wide international observation, such as a full OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission with 12 core and 22 long-term international election observers, and requested 300 short-term international election observers, as well as delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. This openness is an expression of the country's “multi‑vector” foreign policy, which aims Astana to be considered a rulesized and predictable player by Western institutions and to retain strong strategic relations with Russia, and intensifying its economic cooperation with China. [5]
Yet, ODIHR's focus on pluralism and positive rating on technical preparation is not always a problem for the authorities since it enables them to appear as ‘reformers on a journey' and take in recommendations without giving up their basic control. [6]
Regional geopolitical implications
At the regional level, the Kurultai elections serve as an illustration of the institutional vitality and outward orientation of Kazakhstan as well as the constraints of political opening in the context of strict modernisation.
The message to neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is that you don't need to reach the red line on the matter of alternation of power, you can use constitutional redesign and electoral choreography to refresh the regime without reaching the red line.
A strong Adilet‑Tokayev bloc in parliament would also give Russia and China the confidence that Kazakhstan's energy and transport policies would continue to be certain while Astana tries to diversify its export routes and improve relations with the European Union and other western countries. [6]
To external actors, what the vote means
The election of August 23rd is not a democratic milestone or merely a routine formality for the Western institutions and partners, such as the EU, OSCE and NATO member states.
These are tangible changes to the constitution and the creation of the Kurultai that – in theory – could help to create a more meaningful parliament, but that now serves primarily to secure a new configuration of a presidential system.
The task for external actors interested in stability and in progressive political opening will be to balance their engagement: to support Kazakhstan's socio-economic modernisation, to advance projects related to connectivity and to promote the rule of law, whilst at all times highlighting structural obstacles to political competition and the necessity to restore the opportunities for independent candidatures and genuine opposition.
Overall, the elections of August 23 reveal a regime that has mastered the constitutional language and is adept at using it as a shield for the rule of law instead of a portal for democratic participation.
Tokayev’s Kazakhstan is not a nation sitting on its laurels: it is actively reshaping institutions, opening the eyes of observers and speaking of parliament's expanded powers - but the direction of travel is an intelligent and resilient guidance and not a democratic transition. From the point of view of analysts and policy makers tracking Central Asia, the new Kurultai will be interesting not so much because it might have the potential to threaten the presidency, but because it will shed some light on Astana's willingness to apply institutional reform to gain international acceptance amidst growing competition in the geopolitical arena of Eurasia.
References
[1]https://www.euronews.com/2026/07/02/kazakhstan-starts-living-by-new-constitution-sets-date-for-parliamentary-elections
[2]https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/08/KAZ%20Early%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_24.08.2026.pdf
[3]https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/08/KAZ%20Early%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026_interim%20report_07.08.2026.pdf
[4]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/23/kazakhstan-holds-parliamentary-election-expected-to-cement-presidents-grip
[5]https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/documents/2026/07/STO%20request_info_sheet_KZ_2026.pdf
[6]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kazakhs-begin-voting-election-set-tighten-presidents-power-2026-08-23/
Author: Dávid Biró, Senior Advisor, Research and Academic Network Lead of the Ludovika Center for Turkic Studies
Image source: https://www.gov.kz/uploads/2026/7/3/01d22ea2f1e3cbdedaebb879d81eeb5b_1280x720.jpg
