Türkiye's Muslim-Centric Alliance

Türkiye's Muslim-Centric Alliance

In a world transitioning towards a more multiplicity and multipolar order, Türkiye has recast its foreign policy priorities around strategic independence and regional preeminence. This involves the slow but steady emergence of a Muslim-centred alliance, encompassing nations like Qatar, Pakistan and Azerbaijan. Rather than an ideological alliance, this new network is a response to regional uncertainty, the need to broaden its strategic partnerships, and to establish its role as a political and security leader in the Muslim world. [1]

The search of such a network by Türkiye is inseparably connected with its foreign policy. The government has in the past decade changed its former Western based foreign policy to the more aggressive multi-faceted foreign policy. Frequently setting it in the context of such concepts as strategic autonomy and humanitarian diplomacy, Turkish policymakers explain their involvement in Muslim-majority countries as the duty of history and geopolitical necessity. This discourse is a mixture of Ottoman and civilisational legacies and political grievances, coupled with a strong basis in modern security and economic issues.[2]

This approach has been shaped by regional turmoil. The wars in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus, and ongoing simmering tensions in the Gulf and South Asia, have highlighted the deficiencies of existing alliance arrangements. For Türkiye, these conflicts have driven the need for agile and responsive partnerships that offer political and military assistance. The 2017 Gulf crisis was pivotal in this respect. Türkiye's swift troop deployment to Qatar was not just an expression of solidarity but also its willingness to play a security role in Muslim conflicts. This transformed the relationship between Türkiye and Qatar into a strategic alliance, blending security cooperation and Qatar has provided significant financial support and investment.[3]

Another pillar of Türkiye’s Muslim-centred policy is Pakistan, albeit in a different context. In official statements, this relationship is touted as a fraternal one, with shared stances on issues like Kashmir, Palestine and the spread of Islamophobia. Military engagements, including naval projects and drones, have also formalised this alliance. Pakistan is critical for Türkiye as a South Asian ally, but also a means to deepen its engagement with the region, enhancing its position as a leader in a larger Muslim political community.[4]

Azerbaijan, though primarily within the Turkic geopolitical fold, is similarly vital for Türkiye. The "one nation, two states" narrative has resulted in close military interoperability, exemplified in the Second Karabakh War. Türkiye's assistance to Baku demonstrated its ability to shift balances of power, while realising a vision of close political-military coordination. This informs Türkiye’s overarching strategy: forging alliances that blend security assurance, arms industry cooperation and political support during crises.

Crucially, Türkiye's new network is not confined to the above three examples. Its recent rapprochement with the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is a pragmatic adjustment, rather than a departure, from this approach. In mending its relations, Türkiye has aimed to overcome isolation, attract foreign investment and bolster its flexibility. This adaptability is a hallmark of Türkiye's strategy: it is not building exclusive alliances, but rather is fostering overlapping and flexible partnerships in the Muslim world.

For the Turkish government, this Muslim-focused alliance is also a reaction to perceived exclusion from Western forums. Delays in its quest for EU membership, its strained relations with NATO, and general geopolitical tensions with Western allies have all contributed to the attractiveness of other geopolitical arrangements. Turkish policymakers frequently call for giving a greater voice to Muslim-majority states in international affairs, and see Türkiye as a bridge, or even a spokesperson, between world regions.

Soft power tools complement these strategies. By offering development assistance, promoting cultural exports, educational programs and media engagement, Türkiye has aimed to forge social links to complement its political relations. Government agencies like TİKA and the Maarif Foundation, combined with the international success of Turkish TV shows, help to position Türkiye as a contemporary and culturally relatable partner. These platforms provide Ankara with the means to exercise long-term power beyond elite diplomacy.

But this novel alignment is volatile and limited in nature. The bloc-building is hampered by competing national interests, economic constraints, and changing regional circumstances. The conflicting nature of the relations of Türkiye i.e. its constant relations with Qatar despite its antagonists or its alliances with Pakistan to counter South Asian conflicts without necessarily being entangled in the ills of the region brings out the limitations of ideological harmony.

Concisely, the alliance-making (Muslim-oriented) of Türkiye must not be regarded as an effort to establish a geopolitical bloc, but as a hedge. It enables it to develop an influence, alleviate pressure and establish itself as an important player in the region. In a world of transactional and shifting alliances, Türkiye’s strategy exemplifies both the challenges and opportunities of middle powers. By grounding its approach in identity politics, but prioritising practical engagement, Ankara is building a unique model of engagement - one that positions it at the forefront of a shifting political landscape in the Muslim world.

References

[1]https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-pakistan-vow-to-boost-cooperation-support-peace-in-gaza

[2]https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/bridging-gulf-turkeys-forward-base-qatar-2017

[3] https://gulfif.org/reflecting-on-the-turkey-qatar-partnership-fifty-years-later/

[4] https://www.trtworld.com/article/12751504

Author: Dávid Biró, Senior Advisor, Research and Academic Network Lead of the Ludovika Center for Turkic Studies 

Image source: https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/22/files/2024/10/Tayyip-Erdogan.jpg